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11 Introduction
This paper models a two-region world economy in the tradition of the new
open economy macroeconomics, with the aim of investigating the macroeco-
nomic consequences of the establishment of a monetary union when labour
markets are unionised.
In the literature on international monetary policy games, the switch from
uncoordinated national monetary policies to a monetary union is generally
argued to lead to higher in‡ation. One reason why the formation of a mon-
etary union is likely to raise in‡ation for a given level of employment is that
the uni…ed central bank’s incentive to boost employment is no longer re-
strained by the cost of the exchange rate depreciation that follows unilateral
monetary expansions (Rogo¤ [1985a]). Higher in‡ation may then result as
a consequence of rational agents anticipating the central bank’s attempt to
create surprise in‡ation.
A further channel leading to higher in‡ation has been recently stressed
in the literature on strategic wage setting. Basically, it is argued that wage
setters may be induced to behave more aggressively in a monetary union
as they perceive an increase in their wages to have a smaller impact on the
union-wide in‡ation rate relative to the one on their country-speci…c in‡ation
rate.1
Asthe moveto amonetary union altersthe strategicenvironment faced by
the central bank and the labour unions, the incentives of both actors should
be explicitly accounted for when analysing the macroeconomic impact of
such a monetary policy regime shift. In this paper, we accomplish this task
in the simplest general-equilibrium setup, where regions have asymmetric
technological as well as institutional labour market features, namely di¤erent
degrees of monopoly power in the factor market and various levels of wage
centralisation.
While moving to a monetary union unambiguously accrues the central
bank’s temptation to in‡ate, this paper shows that such a monetary policy
regime shift may either favour or inhibit wage discipline. Wage setters are
found to behave less aggressively in the monetary union relative to a regime
of uncoordinated monetary policies, provided the central bank is not too
conservative.
1This point has been stressed by Zervoyanni [1997], Grüner and Hefeker [1999], Cukier-
man and Lippi [2000] and Soskice and Iversen [1998], among others.
2For an intuitive account of this result, consider the unions’ perception of
the in‡ationary consequences of their wage claims in the two monetary pol-
icy regimes. Under non-cooperative national monetary policies, each union
understands that the increase in its own wage raises domestic in‡ation to an
extent that is larger the bigger the union and the lower the central bank’s in-
‡ation aversion. When switching to a monetary union, the weight of domestic
wages in the union-wide in‡ation rate reduces. Labour unions, however, may
nonetheless perceive higher in‡ationary repercussions of their wage hikes as
they correctly anticipate the response of the uni…ed central bank to wage
pressure to be stronger than the one of national central banks for the same
degree of conservativeness. This latter e¤ect is higher the less conservative
the central bank. As higher in‡ation awareness on the part of unions favours
wage restraint, not too conservative a central bank may then turn out to
induce a less aggressive wage behaviour in a monetary union relative to a
regime of uncoordinated national monetary policies.
In contrast to Rogo¤ [1985a]; this paper further shows that international
monetary policy cooperation may be e¤ective in reducing wage in‡ation.
In our setup, the union-wide in‡ation rate falls short of the one under un-
coordinated national monetary policies when wage setting is internationally
centralised and the uni…ed central bank is not too conservative, namely when
wage restraint is strong enough so as to compensate for the in‡ationary con-
sequences of central bank’s behaviour.
Since the contributions by Velasco and Guzzo [1999] and Lippi [2000], it
is well-known that monetary institutions, such as central bank’s conserva-
tiveness, may permanently a¤ect the trade-o¤ between in‡ation and unem-
ployment through their e¤ects on strategic wage setting. The results in this
paper may be read as extending this insight to a particular monetary policy
regime shift, by showing that the macroeconomic consequences of establish-
ing a monetary union may depend in a non-linear way on central banking
institutions.2
Strategic interactions between the uni…ed central bank and wage setters
as those analysed in this paper may be relevant in determining the in‡ation-
ary performance in the EMU, as several European countries are characterised
by intermediate to high centralisation in wage bargaining.3 The results in
2The signi…cance of unionised wage setting for the otpimal design of central banking
institutions in a closed economy is analysed, among others, by Lawler [2000].
3Calmfors [2000] provides a comprehensive survey of nominal wage bargaining within
EMU, which focuses on the impact of given bargaining institutions on real wages and
3the paper stress the harmful consequences of establishing the anti-in‡ation
credententials of the European Central Bank (ECB) through the standard
Barro-Gordon way of reputation building. Our analysis suggests that ap-
pointing an ultra-conservative central banker at the ECB and imparting a
”de‡ationary bias” in the conduct of the European monetary policy, besides
the usual costs in terms of employment, may turn out to threaten the ECB’s
anti-in‡ationary credibility.4
This paper is closely related to a contribution by Cukierman and Lippi
[2000]; which analyses the implications of the establishment of a monetary
union for strategic wage behaviour. Three main distinguishing features char-
acterise the approach proposed in this paper. Firstly, we explicitly derive
demands for both labour and goods from pro…t and utility maximization,
while Cukierman and Lippi adopt a partial equilibrium approach. Secondly,
our framework encompasses trade across the countries in the monetary union.
Finally, we make a …rst step towards a welfare-based analysis of the strategic
interactions between central banks and wage setters by specifying preferences
for unions and the central bank that are consistent with the behavioral analy-
sis. Building on our micro-founded framework, we are able to show that the
establishment of a monetary union may induce a more or less aggressive wage
behaviour, thus increasing or decreasing area-wide in‡ation for a given level
of employment, while only the former e¤ect may appear in their model.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a reduced-form
representation of the two-country world economy. Section 3 describes the
one-shot game between the central bank and the unions in the two monetary
policy regimes. In section 4, the equilibrium outcomes under uncoordinated
national monetary policies and a monetary union are compared in the case
of uncoordinated national wage setting as well as under international wage
centralisation. Section 5 concludes. In the Appendix, the model of a two-
country world economy is laid out.
unemployment as well as on the likely e¤ects of EMU on those institutions.
4This accords with the views expressed in Allsopp and Vines [1998] favouring the
development of an appropriate reaction function rather than the establishment of a tough
anti-in‡ationary reputation as the main task of the ECB. A similar conclusion is drawn
by Bean [1998]:
42 The world economy
The world economy consists of two equally-sized regions, Home and Foreign.
Home is inhabited by a continuum of agents j 2 (0;1=2]: Agents living in
Foreign are indexed by j¤ 2 [1=2;1): As in Corsetti and Pesenti [2000], each
country produces a single traded good out of di¤erentiated labour units, `i,
indexed in the interval (0;1). Home workers are organized in n ¸ 1 unions,
Foreign workers in n¤ ¸ 1 unions of size n¡1 and n¤¡1; respectively: Each
union sets nominal wages on behalf of its members.
2.1 The reduced-form representation
In each country, two reduced-form equations are needed for studying the
monetary policy game (a detailed description of the economy is provided in
the Appendix). The …rst one is obtained by substituting aggregate demand
for the domestic good (A8) and optimal price-setting (A10) into the demand
for labour of type i (A3) and taking logarithms
ln`i = ¡µ(wi ¡ w) ¡ w + ¼ (1)
where wi is the growth of the nominal wage of labour of type i, w is the
aggregate nominal wage growth, and ¼ is the in‡ation rate.5
The second reduced-form equation is derived by substituting labour de-
mand (A3) and nominal aggregate pro…ts into the individual budget con-
straint (A6). Since unions are assumed to take aggregate pro…ts as given,
this gives
ci = (1 ¡ µ)(wi ¡w) (2)
where ci is (the log of) real consumption. The central bank does not take
aggregate pro…ts as given when choosing monetary policy and faces the fol-
lowing reduced-form budget constraint
ci = (1 ¡ µ)(wi ¡ w) ¡ w + ¼ (3)
5By normalising the previous period nominal wage to unity, the current nominal wage
can be expressed as
Wi = 1 + wi
where wi is the percent increase in the nominal wage of worker i. In the text, the following
approximations are used: log(Wi
W ) = wi ¡w and log( P
W ) = ¼ ¡w
5Three equations parallel to (1)-(3) hold for the foreign country.
2.2 Central bank’s preferences
In the regime of uncoordinated national monetary policies, the objective
function of both the domestic and foreign central bank is designed so as to






















where U is the utility function (A4). The parameter ¯ captures the weight
of in‡ation relative to other policy targets and represents the central bank’s
degree of ”conservativeness” (Rogo¤ [1985b]).
The common central bank also cares about the average utility of the




















where ¼ = (¼ + ¼¤)=2: In specifying the central bank’s preferences (4) and
(5), we have assumed that monetary conservativeness does not vary, so as
to focus on in‡ation targeting as the only di¤erence across monetary pol-
icy regimes. While domestic and foreign central banks aim at controlling
country-speci…c in‡ation, the uni…ed central bank has an average in‡ation
target. 6 As will become apparent soon, this alters the central bank’s incen-
tive to in‡ate as well as nominal wage setting.
2.3 Unions’ preferences
Each domestic and foreign union is interested in the average utility of its
members
6The central bank in a monetary union could also target union-wide in‡ation. However,
this would not be consistent with the way in‡ation targeting is actually practiced. The












It is worth stressing that we abstract from unions’ in‡ation aversion, so as
to focus on the monetary policy regime shift as the only incentive for wage
restraint.7
3 Strategic monetary policy
This section describes the one-shot, two-stage game between national cen-
tral banks and labour unions in a monetary union, U, and in a regime of
uncoordinated monetary policies, N.
In the …rst stage, each national union sets the rate of growth of the
nominal wage of its members in an uncoordinated way relative to both foreign
and other national unions. After wages are set, the uni…ed central bank
picks the average in‡ation rate in the monetary union, while each national
central bank chooses the country-speci…c in‡ation rate in the uncoordinated
monetary policy regime. Finally, given real wages …rms choose employment
and produce the traded goods. The game is solved by backward induction.
3.1 The central bank’s problem
In the regime of uncoordinated national monetary policies, the domestic cen-
tral bank chooses the national in‡ation rate so as to maximize (4) subject to




ln`jdj ¡ ¯¼ = 0 (7)
An equation similar to (7) describes the behaviour of the foreign central bank.
The reaction functions of the domestic and foreign central banks are common
7The macroeconomic impact of a monetary union when labour unions are in‡ation
averse is analysed, among others, by Cukierman and Lippi [2000], Grüner and Hefeker
[1999] and Soskice and Iversen [1998].
7knowledge for wage-setters, who can easily calculate the in‡ationary impact














¤N 2 (0;1) (8)
In the monetary union, the uni…ed central bank chooses the average in‡a-
tion rate so as to maximize the utility of all agents in the union (5) subject to















¡ ¯¼ = 0 (9)
Building on (9), domestic and foreign unions calculate the union-wide
















Comparing (8) and (10), it appears that the monetary policy regime shift
has two opposing e¤ects on the way domestic and foreign unions perceive the
in‡ationary consequences of their wage claims.
On one hand, the establishment of a monetary union decreases the per-
ceived in‡ationary impact of national wage hikes, as unions are smaller rela-
tive to the whole population in the monetary union (this is captured by the
…rst addend in brackets). A one percent increase in domestic wages, in fact,
has an impact on the domestic aggregate price level and hence on domestic
in‡ation equal to 1/2 percent, while this halves to 1/4 percent when the
average in‡ation rate in the monetary union is considered.
On the other hand, switching from uncoordinated monetary policies to a
monetary union accrues the central bank’s temptation to in‡ate (as captured
by the second addend in brackets). Under uncoordinated monetary policies,
in fact, national central banks are refrained from generating surprise in‡ation
8due to the exchange rate costs that follow unilateral monetary expansions,
while these costs obviously disappear in the monetary union. This in turn
may increase the unions’ in‡ation awareness, as unions perceive the response
of the common central bank to an increase in nominal wages to be stronger
than the one of national central banks.
As will become apparent later, a high in‡ation awareness on the part of
unions favours wage moderation as it leads each union to internalise the re-
duction in the real wage of other unions that follows the increase in its own
wage.8 Whether the switch to a monetary union may discipline wage setters
then crucially depends on which one of the two opposing e¤ects discussed
above prevails. It can be easily shown that the perceived in‡ationary con-
sequences of an increase in domestic wages are higher in a monetary union
relative to a regime of uncoordinated national monetary policies provided




N ¸ 0 i¤ ¯ · 2· (11)
3.2 The unions’ problem
Under simultaneous bargaining, each national union sets the rate of growth
of the nominal wage of its members so as to maximize (6) subject to (1),
(2), the central bank’s reaction function in the appropriate monetary policy
regime, i.e. (7) or (9), and taking as given the nominal wages set by other
unions at home and abroad. The optimal non-cooperative strategy of the




r·ln`i = 0 (12)
where »
r is the elasticity of labour demand to the nominal wage of union i































8This is analogous to the ”adverse competition” e¤ect in Cukierman and Lippi [2000].
9An analogous equation describes the behaviour of the foreign union i¤: A
unitary increase in the nominal wage of union i has two contrasting e¤ects
on its members’ utility. On one side, utility decreases since consumption
reduces (this is captured by the term in brackets in (12)), while on the other
side the increase in leisure raises utility.9 Each union’s optimal nominal wage
is then set so as to balance these costs and bene…ts.
It is apparent in (12) that a high in‡ation awareness on the part of unions,
a high s, reduces the marginal utility of consumption while raising the mar-
ginal disutility of labour e¤ort. As output is sub-optimally low due to mo-
nopolistic distortions, this will reduce unions’ welfare and will thus discipline
wage bevahiour.
Drawing on the constant relation between increases in nominal and real
relative wages, dwi=dln(Wi=P) = 1=(1 ¡ sr), we can cast the …rst order con-










where ´r ´ »
r=(1 ¡ sr) is the elasticity of the demand for labour of type i to
the real relative wage in regime r.
Using (13) and (8) or (10) when appropriate, the elasticity of labour
demand to the real wage in the two monetary regimes can be easily expressed




(n ¡ 1)· + n¯




(n ¡ 1)2· + n¯
(µ ¡1)(n ¡ 1) + 1 (15)
4 In‡ation under alternative monetary regimes
Under uncoordinated national monetary policies, the Home and Foreign in-
‡ation rates can be obtained by combining the respective unions’ equilibrium
strategies (12) in a symmetric equilibrium, (`i = `), with the central bank’s
reaction function (7), which yields the area-wide average in‡ation rate
9The overall e¤ect of the increase in the nominal wage of union i on consumption is
negative, since the e¤ect of the increase in the real wage (1¡s) is smaller than the reduction












For the well-known reason discussed in Kydland and Prescott [1977] and
Barro and Gordon [1983], equilibrium in‡ation is sub-optimally positive.
Other than on central bank’s in‡ation aversion, ¯, the economy’s in‡ationary
bias depends on labour market features as synthesised in the elasticities ´N
and ´¤N . Using (15) it is easy to verify that equilibrium in‡ation is higher
the less substitutable the di¤erent types of labour and the more decentralised
the wage bargaining structure.10
A similar procedure that combines (12) and (9) yields the equilibrium












Comparing the area-wide in‡ation rates in the two monetary regimes, (16)
and (17), it appears that in the absence of strategic e¤ects - i.e., when ´U =
´N and ´¤U = ´¤N- in‡ation under uncoordinated national monetary policies
is unambiguously lower than the one in a monetary union. The reason is the
stronger incentive for the common central bank to resort to surprise in‡ation
relative to national central banks (Rogo¤ [1985]).11 This matches with the
empirical regularity documented by Romer [1993] showing that more open
economies have a better in‡ationary performance in a broad cross-section of
countries.12
When wage setters are large, however, the move to a monetary union also
a¤ects wage behaviour and hence in‡ation in a direction that is not clear a
priori. As already discussed, the establishment of a monetary union may
10This accords with the analysis in Cubitt [1992] and Calmfors and Dri¢l [1988]:
11In our setup, the common central bank has an incentive to in‡ate four time higher
than the one of national central banks. This depends on two factors that are at work
also in a more general framework, namely the economy’s degree of openness and the type
of in‡ation targeting. In our speci…cation, trade openness is 1/2 under uncoordinated
national monetary policies, while the monetary union is a closed economy. This accounts
for the common central bank having twice an incentive to in‡ate relative to national central
banks. By the same token, average versus country-speci…c in‡ation targeting amounts to
a double temptation to in‡ate in our setting.
12See also Lane [1997] and Campillo and Miron [1997], among others. Cavallari [2001]
investigates the link between in‡ation and openness when wage setters are large.
11favour wage restraint, provided the uni…ed central bank is not too conserv-
ative. This in turn will reduce the economy’s in‡ationary bias for a given
level of employment, by increasing the elasticities of labour demand in (17)
relative to the ones in (16).
4.1 International wage coordination
In our setup, wage discipline under a monetary union, when it occurs, is
not able to compensate for the increase in the union-wide in‡ationary bias
due to central bank’s behaviour. This leads one to question under what cir-
cumstances would such a wage restraint e¤ect be strong enough to reduce
in‡ation. An obvious candidate is the case of international wage coordina-
tion, where wage discipline is at its best. As recently stressed in the literature
on nominal wage bargaining, the switch to a monetary union is likely to alter
the structure of wage setting across the member countries, although opinions
diverge as to the directions of this change.13
Asan example of international wage coordination, considerasovra-national
union that sets domestic and foreign nominal wages so as to maximise the
average utility of the population in the monetary union, which for simplicity





under (1), (2) and the uni…ed central bank’s reaction function (9). This












W = 1 +
(µ ¡ 1)
sW (20)
and the superscript W stands for wage centralisation. The sovra-national
union uses (9) so as to compute the perceived in‡ationary impact of an
13Calmfors [2000] argues in favour of less centralisation in wage setting as a result of
monetary uni…cation, while Holden [1999] stresses the higher gains to wage centralisation
in a monetary union.






Following the same steps as before, we can easily derive equilibrium in‡ation





Comparing (16) and (22), it is easy to verify that, di¤erently from na-
tional wage bargaining, in‡ation in the monetary union may fall short of the
one under uncoordinated national monetary policies when wage setting is in-
ternationally centralised. We can further show that this holds true provided
the central bank is not too conservative. Using (8 )and (15) as well as (21)
and (20) in, respectively, (16) and (22), we obtain
¼
N ¡ ¼
W ´ ¡a¯ + b ¯
2 + c ¸ 0 (23)
i¤ ¯ · ¯
¤
where a = (µ + 1)=2, b = ·[6 + (µ ¡ 1)(8n ¡ 10)] , c = 8·2(µ ¡ 1)(n ¡1)
and ¯
¤ is the positive root of the equation in (23).
For an intuitive account of this result, consider that under wage central-
isation the switch to a monetary union always disciplines wage behaviour,
as the sovra-national union internalises the higher incentive to accomodate
wage in‡ation of the common central bank relative to national central banks.
The overall e¤ect of the monetary policy regime shift on in‡ation then de-
pends on whether wage restraint is strong enough so as to compensate for
the higher central bank’s temptation to in‡ate. A less in‡ation averse central
bank, by increasing the in‡ation awareness of the sovra-national union while
not a¤ecting the central bank’s incentive to in‡ate across monetary regimes,
may induce a less aggressive wage behaviour and hence lower in‡ation in the
monetary union.
14As countries are symmetric, foreign and domestic wages are equal.
135 Conclusions
Building on a micro-founded model of a two-region world economy, this pa-
per has analysed the behaviour of large wage-setters when switching from a
regime of uncoordinated national monetary policies to a monetary union.
Provided the uni…ed central bank is not too conservative, we have shown
that the switch from uncoordinated monetary policies to a monetary union
may favour wage restraint. We have also shown that wage discipline may
reduce equilibrium in‡ation in a monetary union relative to the one under
uncoordinated national monetary policies if wage setting is centralised across
the members of the monetary union.
6 Appendix











where Y represents output of the domestic good and µ > 1 captures the
degree of substitutability among di¤erent labour types.
Let Wi represent the Home nominal wage of worker i. Then, W, the price
index for labour inputs, is de…ned as the minimal nominal cost of producing
















Agents’ utility is given by





where the real consumption index C aggregates consumption of the domestic








14In this setup, economic size, as measured by the weight of Home goods in
world consumption, coincides with population size.
While markets are complete domestically (everyone owns an equal share
of all domestic …rms), there is no international equity trade. As will be-
come apparent later, this assumption is benign. Given the Cobb-Douglas
preferences over domestic and foreign goods (A5) and the separability of
individuals’ utility functions, in fact, international equity trade would not
a¤ect equilibrium outcomes.
The budget constraint of the representative agent is
PCj = W`j + Dj (A6)
where Dj are nominal aggregate pro…ts.
Home’ and Foreign’s current account, which are obtained by aggregating
(A6) in the interval (0; 1
2] and [1
2;1) respectively, are balanced when consump-
tion is equalized across countries
C = C
¤ = C (A7)
Then, aggregate demand for both the Home and the Foreign good is a linear











where PH is the nominal price of the domestic good, PF is the domestic-
currency price of the foreign good after normalising the nominal exchange








It is easy to verify that pro…t-maximizing …rms will set the nominal price for
the good they produce equal to the aggregate nominal wage
PH = W (A10)
PF = W
¤
A parallel representation exists for the Foreign economy.
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